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Abstract 
 
 
An optimal education subsidy formula is derived using an overlapping generations 
model with parental altruism. The model predicts that public education subsidy is 
greater in economies with lesser parental altruism because a benevolent government 
has to compensate for the shortfall in private education spending of less altruistic 
parents with a finite life. On the other hand, growth is higher in economies with 
greater parental altruism. Cross-country regressions using the World Values Survey 
for altruism lend support to our model predictions.  The model provides insights about 
the reasons for higher education subsidy in richer countries. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* This paper is an extension of Ch. 2 of Armellini’s PhD thesis (2009). We benefitted from the useful 
comments and discussions from Thomas Renstrom, Peter Sinclair, Kunal Sen and Indraneel Dasgupta.  
The usual disclaimer applies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a growing literature on the social desirability of education subsidy. 
Should the government directly or indirectly subsidise education or should it be left in 
the realm of private decision-making? The literature in this regard can be broadly 
divided in two strands. The first strand advocates education subsidy as a redistributive 
policy in the presence of credit market imperfections. Such capital market 
imperfections pose barriers to poor individuals to finance schooling.1 The second 
strand uses a growth-human capital framework to argue that education subsidy is 
needed because the private returns to human capital could fall short of the social 
returns. Human capital may have a positive spillover on productivity that may not be 
privately internalized (Lucas, 1988, Azariadis and Drazen, 1990 and Tamura, 1991). 
Education subsidy is needed to correct for this externality. Acemoglu and Angrist 
(1999), Bils and Klenov (2000) and Krueger and Lindahl (1999), however, question 
this positive externality argument.2  
We approach the issue of education subsidy by striking a middle ground 
between these two strands of literature. First, in our model we have an extreme form 
of capital market imperfection as in Loury (1981) where education cannot be financed 
through the credit market. Second, we have endogenous growth via the accumulation 
of human capital. Human capital investment is driven by parental altruism which 
turns out to be a key determinant of public education subsidy. If parents are less 
altruistic towards their children, they will spend less on offspring’s education. This 
happens because parents, due to their finite lives, do not internalise the full growth 
effects of education by maximizing the discounted stream of utilities of all future 
generations.  This gives rise to a discrepancy between the private and social returns to 
education. A far sighted government needs to correct this externality by instituting an 
educational subsidy.  The rate of education subsidy is higher in economies where 
parents are less altruistic because a far sighted government has to compensate for this 
shortfall in schooling investment by subsidising education.  More altruistic societies 
                                                 
1 See Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993, Perotti, 1993 and Benabou, 1999. This view has been challenged 
by Cameron and Heckman (1998), Cameron and Tabler (2000), Keane and Wolpin (1999) and Shea 
(2000). 
2 The distinction between these two strands is not sharp. There are papers which combine growth and 
credit market imperfections. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) argue that public education lowers income 
inequality but it may lower per capita income unless initial income inequality crosses a threshold. 
Bandyopadhyay and Basu (2005) make a case for redistributive tax-subsidy measure in the context of 
human capital and endogenous growth.  
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thus receive less public subsidy to education but grow faster which is the key testable 
hypothesis in this paper.3  
We establish this key hypothesis by employing a simple overlapping 
generations model with limited altruism where parents care only about the immediate 
descendant’s welfare. A closed-form formula for the optimal education subsidy is 
derived to show the explicit relation between parental altruism and the education 
subsidy. We test the key theoretical prediction of the model using cross-country data 
and some hitherto unexplored data for parental altruism based on the World Values 
Survey. Our cross-country regressions of education subsidy on parental altruism after 
controlling for various macroeconomic factors lend support to the key predictions of 
the model.   Given that governments in rich countries spend systematically more on 
education than in poor countries, a new testable hypothesis emanates from our model 
whether parents in richer countries are less altruistic.  Cross country data lend support 
to this hypothesis.    
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we lay out the 
model. Section 3 provides some empirical justification of the model. Section 4 
concludes.  
2. The Model 
At each date there is a continuum of identical agents in the unit interval who live for 
two periods. Each such adult agent is attached to a single offspring. During the first 
period (date t-1) of their life, agents do not consume; they go to school and transform 
the inherited human capital 1−th  into a flow income using a linear schooling 
technology, 1−tah , where 0>a . The parameter a  represents the return to schooling. 
In the second period t they allocate their resources between consumption ( tc ) and 
child’s education ( tb ).  This flow education spending is converted one-for-one into 
stock of knowledge ( th ) using a technology: th = tb .  As in Loury (1981), we assume 
that there is no credit market to finance education spending. The adult receives direct 
                                                 
3 The relationship between public education subsidy and private altruism is a relatively unexplored area 
of research.  To the best of our knowledge, Eckstein and Zilcha (1994) come close to the issue that we 
address. However, their focus is more on compulsory public education while we look at broader 
education subsidy.  
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altruistic utility from his immediate descendant’s consumption which is positively 
related to the amount the adult spends on his kid’s education.  This parental altruism 
is formulated by inserting th in parent’s utility function.
4    
 The agent born at date t-1 thus has the following utility function: 
(1) =tW )()1()( tt hVcU θθ −+  
where tW  is the adult’s welfare, tc  =consumption in period t and th = knowledge 
acquired by the individual’s child. The degree of parental altruism is represented by 
(1 )θ− , as it shows the effect that the parent’s spending on the child’s education has 
on utility.  
There is a government that imposes a lump-sum tax equal to tT  on all 
individuals, and subsidises education expenditure at a flat rate tω . An individual born 
at date t-1 will thus face the following flow budget constraint: 
 
(2) ttttt hcTah )1(1 ω−+=−−  
The left-hand side of (2) shows the total resources: initial wealth ( 1−tah ) minus the 
lump sum tax. The right-hand side of (2) shows the use of the resources, which can be 
either spent on consumption or education. The fact that the expenditure on education 
is subsidised at a rate tω  is reflected in the factor )1( tω− . Individuals maximise (1) 
subject to (2).  
The government balances the budget and faces the following budget 
constraint: 
(3) ttt hT ω=  
The adult chooses his consumption and schooling spending on his offspring treating 
the taxes ( tT ) educational subsidy rate ( tω ) as given.  
The first order condition for the adult’s problem equates the marginal utility 
cost of educational investment (net of education subsidy) to the marginal altruistic 
utility gain:  
                                                 
4 The altruism in our model is limited in the sense that the adult cares only about the immediate 
descendant’s welfare. The modelling of parental altruism follows Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and 
Bräuninger and Vidal (2000).  
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(4)      )('1)(')1( ttt hVcU θ
θω −=−  
Using (2) and the government budget constraint (3),  (4) can be rewritten as: 
 
(5)   )('1)(')1( 1 tttt hVhahU θ
θω −=−− −  
The comparative statics effect of a change in education subsidy on schooling and 
consumption spending of the adult is thus given by:  
(6)   
)](''1)('')1[(
)(' 1
ttt
tt
t
t
hVcU
hahUh
θ
θωω −+−
−−=∂
∂ − >0 
and 
(7)  
t
t
t
t hc
ωω ∂
∂−=∂
∂  <0 
The total expenditure on education (ht) is positively related to the rate of subsidy 
while the adult’s consumption is negatively related to the subsidy.  
 
Private Desirability of Education Subsidy  
Is a higher education subsidy beneficial for private welfare?  To investigate this 
differentiate the private welfare (1) with respect to tω , use (7) and set the partial 
equal to zero to obtain the first order condition for optimal education subsidy. 
(8)    0)].(')1()('[ =∂
∂−+−
t
t
tt
hhVcU ωθθ  
Since 
t
th
ω∂
∂
 is positive as shown in (6),  the necessary condition for privately optimal 
education subsidy must satisfy 
(9)  )('.1)(' tt hVcU θ
θ−=    
Comparison with (5) immediately reveals that the optimal education subsidy must be 
zero.  We thus have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: The privately optimal education subsidy ( tω ) is zero for all t.   
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Education subsidy is thus not privately desirable.  The result follows from the basic 
principles of uniform commodity taxation.  Since consumption is not taxed or 
subsidised, the optimal subsidy to education must be zero.  The adult is thus worse off 
with an education subsidy.  To see this more clearly, take a parametric example. 
Assume that the adult’s utility function (1) is logarithmic.  In other words,    
(10)     tW = tt hc ln)1(ln θθ −+     
which implies the following consumption and education policies for the adult: 
(11)   [ ]ttt Tahc −= −1.θ  
(12)   [ ]ttt Tahh −−
−= −11
1
ω
θ  
 
Plugging the government budget constraint (3) into (11) and (12) one obtains the 
following equilibrium policy rules:  
(13) 1.1
)1.(
−−
−= t
t
t h
ah θω
θ  
(14) 1.1
)1(.
−−
−= t
t
t
t h
ac θω
ωθ  
which upon substitution in (10) and differentiation with respect to tω yields:  
   
(15)     
ttt
tW
θω
θ
ω
θ
ω −+−−=∂
∂
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The two terms on the right hand side of expression (15) represent the private marginal 
cost and benefit (respectively) of increasing subsidies: more subsidies decrease 
parent’s consumption  ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ <∂
∂ 0
t
tc
ω , which is a cost in terms of utility. At the same 
time, more subsidies increase expenditure on education ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ >∂
∂ 0
t
th
ω  and thus give 
greater utility to parents. As long as 0 1θ< < , the marginal costs are greater than the 
marginal benefits. Parents are thus worse off with a higher education subsidy. Even 
though higher education subsidy promotes growth, altruistic parents do not internalize 
this growth effect of an education subsidy.  
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Socially Optimal Education Subsidy  
We now turn our attention to designing an optimal education subsidy when the 
government is far sighted and benevolent in the sense that it takes into account the 
welfare of finitely lived future generations.  The government takes the private sector 
behaviour as given and commits to a sequence of education subsidy { tω } that 
maximizes the discounted stream of indirect utilities of all generations. Doing so, the 
government arrives at a socially optimal education subsidy.    
      We solve the socially optimal education subsidy in two steps. First, we solve the 
far sighted government’s problem setting up a fictitious social planning problem.  The 
planner solves the intertemporal allocation of consumption ( tc ) and human capital 
( th ) taking into account the welfare of the future generations.  From the social 
planner’s problem, we work out the social intergenerational marginal rate of 
substitution in consumption.  In the next step, from the adult’s private optimization 
problem we work out the education subsidy which reproduces the social marginal rate 
of substitution in consumption.  
The social planning problem is given by:    
(P)             Max   )]()1()([
0
tt
t
t hVcU θθβ −+∑∞
=
  
                    s.t.   1−=+ ttt ahhc  
The first order condition for the social planning problem (P) is given by:  
(16)                     )(')('1)(' 1++−= ttt caUhVcU βθ
θ   
The social planner equates the marginal utility cost of education spending to the 
instantaneous marginal utility benefit of education spending plus the discounted future 
marginal utility of consumption of the future generation.  The private agent fails to 
internalize the growth effect of education spending and that is why the term 
)(' 1+tcaUβ does not appear in adult’s first order condition (4).  This difference 
between the social and private benefits of education spending is an externality that the 
government needs to correct by formulating the right education subsidy.   
    Comparing (4) with (16), it immediately follows that the socially optimal education  
subsidy is:  
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(17)   
)('
)(' 1
t
t
t cU
cUa += βω       
The socially optimal education subsidy is thus positive while in contrast the privately 
optimal education subsidy is zero.   The education subsidy is proportional to the 
marginal product of human capital ( a ) and the social intertemporal marginal rate of 
substitution in consumption.   
    For a logarithmic utility function as in (10), a closed form expression for the 
socially optimal education subsidy exists.  We have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2:  If tW = tt hc ln)1(ln θθ −+  , a far sighted government sets the 
optimal education subsidy at a constant level given by:   
 (18) 
)1.(1 βθ
βω −−=  
and the socially optimal balanced growth rate is given by:   
             (19) 
1
[1 (1 )]t
t
h a
h
θ β
−
= − −  
Proof: Appendix. 
 
The optimal education subsidy is negatively related to the degree of parental altruism.  
In other words, ω  decreases with θ−1 . This means that in countries with greater 
parental altruism, education subsidy will be lower. Intuitively, when parents are 
altruistic enough to naturally spend on their children’s education, there is less need for 
a government subsidy. The government has to compensate for the lack of parents’ 
altruism via subsidies. For example, as evident from (18) in a non-altruistic society 
( 1θ → ), the rate of subsidy will tend to 100% ( 1ω → ).  
  Second, the optimal education subsidy is positively related to β . A forward-
looking government that looks after the future generations has to care about growth. 
The parameter β  represents the degree of benevolence or foresightedness of the 
government.  At one extreme, if the government values the future generations as 
much as the present (β→1), then (18) means that 1ω → , which is the maximum level 
of subsidy (100% subsidy). At the other extreme, a completely short-sighted 
government ( β =0) will set 0=ω .  Greater foresight of the government means higher 
subsidy to education.  
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Finally, the optimal growth rate (19) is higher in economies with a greater 
altruism (lesser θ ) and greater foresight of the government (larger β ).  Comparison 
with (13) immediately reveals that the socially optimal growth rate is higher than the 
privately optimal growth rate, (1 )a θ−  which is obtained by plugging ω  equal to zero 
in (13). The difference between social and private growth rates is θβa  which 
represents the degree of externality.  This term basically consists of an interaction 
between returns to education ( a ), the lack of private altruism (θ ) and government 
benevolence or foresight (β ). This clearly demonstrates the role of a benevolent 
government who cares for growth while designing an optimal education subsidy.   
The two key testable hypotheses thus originate from the model which can be 
summarized by the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2  (i) The optimal education subsidy is higher if the degree of private 
altruism ( )θ  is lower, and the social rate of discount is lower ( β/1 ). 
(ii)  The growth rate is higher in economies with greater private altruism and lower 
social rate of discount. 
In the next section, we look for empirical support for these two hypotheses 
using cross country data.  
 
3. Cross-Country Relation between Altruism, Education 
Subsidy and Growth 
Data 
Measuring Education Subsidy  
There is no internationally comparable indicator for the level of subsidies to 
education, which comes closest to the model ω . We construct a proxy for this by 
computing the ratio of public expenditure on education to the total expenditure on 
education.  The total expenditure on education is the sum of private and public 
spending on education.   For example, if an individual spends h on education, a rate of 
subsidy ω means that the individual receives a subsidy of ω.h units. This means that 
out of total expenditure on education h, only ω.h units are public subsidy to 
education. Thus,  
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.Public expenditure on education
Total expenditure on education . (1 ).
t
t t
h
h h
ω ωω ω= =+ −  
The appendix details the data sources for public and private spending on education. 
In the regression reported later, we label this measure as Subsidies. Figure 1 
plots this for all the countries in our sample. Subsidies range from about 45% to 99% 
which shows a substantial variation. Figure 2 plots Subsidies against log of GDP per 
capita. Rich countries subsidise education more than poor countries.  
<Figures 1 and 2 come here> 
Proxy for Altruism 
Our proxy for altruism comes from the question A026 of the World Values 
Survey5, reproduced here: 
 “Which of the following statements best describes your views about parents' 
responsibilities to their children?: A- Parents' duty is to do their best for their 
children even at the expense of their own well-being; B- Parents have a life of their 
own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their 
children”.  
The proxy for altruism is the percentage of people choosing answer A from the 
previous question in each country. The survey is carried out in different years in 
different countries, and most countries have only one available observation for the 
period 1994-2004 (where there are two available observations for a country we take 
the average of these two). We call this proxy Altruism. 6 While arguably this could be 
an imperfect measure of parental altruism, to the best of our knowledge this is the first 
time this World Values Survey is used to identify altruism as a possible determinant 
of public education subsidy.7 
                                                 
5 European and World Value Survey four-wave integrated data file, 1981-2004, v.20060423, 2006. The 
European Values Study Foundation and World Values Survey Association. Aggregate File Producers: 
ASEP/JDS, Madrid, Spain/Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands. Aggregate File Distributors: 
ASEP/JDS and ZA, Cologne, Germany.  
6 Previous research has used monetary transfers made by individuals as a proxy for altruism. For 
example, Bouhga-Hagbe (2006) looks at the remittances of migrant workers as an expression of their 
altruism. Andreoni (2006) compares altruism across countries by looking at the percentage of cash 
revenues of the non-profit sector that are received from philanthropy. Castillo and Carter (2002) run 
behavioural experiments in South African communities, and derive their measure of altruism from the 
amount of money that the individuals are willing to transfer in their ‘dictator game’. However, these 
are not real proxies for altruism but rather some of its consequences. Furthermore, those measures tend 
to be aggregated and not standardised, whereas the measure presented here focuses particularly on 
preference based altruism from parents to children, which comes closest to the utility function 
developed in our theoretical model.  
7 Alesina et al. (2010) use the world value survey to get a measure of family ties. However, their focus 
is on the regulation of labour market while we address the issue of education subsidy.      
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Altruism may not be necessarily represented by a continuous variable in the 
context of cross-country regressions because its effect may show up across countries 
once a threshold is reached. In other words, two countries may differ in Altruism by a 
few percents and this may not make much difference to the measure of education 
subsidy or growth. To take this possibility into account, three dummies are 
constructed classifying countries as follows. The first dummy for altruism takes the 
value 1 when a country has a value of Altruism on the top 50% of the values of the 
sample (median), and 0 otherwise. A second associated dummy for altruism takes the 
value 1 when a country has a value of Altruism on the top 33% of the values of the 
sample, and 0 otherwise. A third associated dummy for altruism takes the value 1 
when a country has a value of Altruism on the top 20% of the values of the sample, 
and 0 otherwise. We call these proxies Altruism Dummy 50%, Altruism Dummy 33% 
and Altruism Dummy 20% respectively. These various dummies are constructed to 
check for robustness of the results.  
 
Social Discount Rate 
For the social discount rate we use the average real interest rate for 1992-2002 
(World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) April 2008, ESDS International, 
(Mimas) University of Manchester) as a proxy.  
 
Common Sample Correlations  
Table 1 presents the simple correlations between subsidy, GDP growth rate, 
altruism and the interest rate. These correlations are consistent with the model 
predictions in Proposition 1. There is a weak negative correlation between education 
subsidy and growth, which might be due to the conflicting responses of growth and 
subsidy to altruism.  
 
<Table 1 comes here> 
 
Cross-Country Regressions  
Although these correlations are broadly consistent with the model, they do not 
necessarily validate the model because these correlations may reflect the influences of 
third factors, which are not accounted in our model. In the next step, we report some 
cross-country regression results in a similar vein as in Barro and Lee (1997). Table 2 
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presents the results of cross-country regressions, where variables are averaged for the 
period 1992-2002. These regressions capture the effects of altruism and social 
discount rate on subsidies after controlling for a number of macroeconomic variables 
such as investment/GDP ratio, per capita GDP, financial deepening, openness and 
others. Note that the number of observations varies in each specification due to the 
availability of data: when more controls are used, fewer observations are available. 
The list of countries included in each specification of Table 2 is presented in 
Appendix B, together with some descriptive statistics. Appendix C presents the 
sources of the data used. 
<Table 2 comes here> 
In all seven specifications the proxies for altruism and social discount rate 
enter with a negative sign, suggesting that more altruistic and short-sighted countries 
tend to subsidise education less. This is in line with the predictions of our model.  
Altruism appears statistically insignificant when it is measured as a continuous 
variable. When it is measured as a discrete dummy, in three out of five cases it 
appears statistically significant. This suggests that altruism has a nonlinear effect on 
education subsidy. The effect appears piecewise nonlinear because it picks up after a 
certain threshold.   
Regarding the economic significance of the altruism coefficients, specification 
(7) of table 2 shows that if a country changes from ‘no altruistic’ to ‘altruistic’ (as 
defined by the 33% dummy), the subsidy rate is expected to decrease by almost 14 
percentage points (see coefficient of Altruism Dummy 33% in specification (7)). 
Considering that the average subsidy of the sample used in that regression is 0.80 
(80%), the estimated effect of altruism on subsidies is economically relevant, as it 
represents a drop of more than 17% of the average value of subsidies.8  
Similar cross-country growth regressions are reported in Table 3. In all these 
specifications the sign of the coefficients of altruism and the social discount rate are 
                                                 
8 For robustness, all the specifications of Table 2 were tested with a variation of the dependent 
variable, where instead of considering the expenditure of households, we include all the private 
expenditure. This alternative was computed as [(Public expenditure on education / (Public + Total 
private expenditure on education) where ‘total private expenditure on education’ includes the 
expenditure of households but also the expenditure of private institutions (firms). The results did not 
change substantially. These results are not reported for brevity and are available upon request.    
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consistent with the model predictions. The statistical insignificance of these 
coefficients is not surprising in view of the fact that there is such a tremendous 
variation in cross country growth rates which could be attributable to a host of 
economic and non-economic factors (Barro and Lee, 1997).   
<Table 3 comes here> 
 
 Are parents in rich countries less altruistic?  
We reported earlier (Figure 2) that there is a strong cross-country positive 
relationship between education subsidy and the per capita GDP. Rich countries tend 
to subsidise education more than poor countries.  Does our model provide any insight 
about this stylized fact?  Given our key theoretical result that optimal education 
subsidy is less in countries with greater parental altruism, a natural question arises 
whether the high education subsidy in rich countries is a possible fallout due to lower 
altruistic nature of parents in rich countries, one effect of which could be less parental 
spending on their children’s education. Since parents spend less on their children’s 
education, the government substitutes this by subsiding education more. 
We investigate this implication of the model by correlating altruism with two 
broad development indicators, (i) the level of per capita GDP, (ii) the degree of 
financial deepening proxied by the ratio of M2 to GDP.  Figure 3 shows the plots of 
altruism against log per capita GDP while Figure 4 shows the plot of altruism against 
M2/GDP.9 The relationship between altruism and both development indicators is 
robustly negative.  The regression of altruism on each of these measures of 
development reported in Table 4 show that this relationship is statistically significant.   
<Figure 3 here> 
 
<Table 4 comes here> 
The relationship between altruism and the level of economic development is 
controversial.  Rapoport and Vidal (2007) draw a useful distinction between two 
components of altruism: (i) “natural altruism” which is simply unconditional parental 
love for their offspring, (ii) “endogenous altruism” which is driven by cost-benefit 
analysis of adults.   In less developed countries where infrastructural facility is poor 
                                                 
9 The common sample for which altruism and M2/GDP series are available for only 24 countries.  
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and private insurance markets are lacking, one may argue that “natural altruism” may 
prevail as a survival mechanism. On the other hand, in advanced economies where 
basic necessities are already met and insurance markets exist to cover old age 
contingencies, parents will choose altruistic behaviour based more on cost-benefit 
considerations. This means that “endogenous altruism” might become more 
predominant in rich countries. It is difficult to ascertain from the World Values 
Survey question A026 whether this parental value represents “natural altruism” or 
“endogenous altruism.” However, since the altruism parameter θ−1  in our model is 
preference driven, it is deemed to be “natural altruism.”  Thus the negative relation 
between altruism and the level of development reported here basically alludes to the 
possibility that natural altruism is less in rich countries.  While the issue whether rich 
parents are less altruistic decidedly warrants more research, the two stylized facts, (i) 
education subsidy in rich countries is greater in rich countries, and (ii) altruism 
indicator is lower in rich countries, lend support to our key theoretical result that 
government in rich countries may subsidise education more to offset the lack of 
parental natural altruism.   
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we present a new hypothesis that parental altruism could be an important 
factor determining the education subsidy.  This hypothesis helps us understand the 
reasons for the enormous cross-country variation in public education spending and 
particularly why in rich countries government spends so much on public education 
compared to poor countries. In countries where parents are less altruistic to their 
offspring, a benevolent forward-looking government has to compensate for this 
private shortfall in education spending by subsidising public education. The socially 
optimal growth rate thus depends positively on private altruism and the government 
benevolence. These theoretical predictions are tested against the cross-country data 
which lend support to our model predictions. Our model and cross country regressions 
also provide insights why governments in rich countries subsidise education more 
than in poor countries.   
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1 
The social planner’s maximization problem is:   
Max   ]ln)1(ln[
0
tt
t
t hc θθβ −+∑∞
=
  
s.t.   1−=+ ttt ahhc  
The first order condition for this problem is: 
(A.1)   01
11
=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−
−
+− ttttt hah
a
hahh
θβθθ    
which is a nonlinear second order difference equation in th .  Conjecture a solution as 
follows: 
  (A.2)      1−= tt hh λ  
We use the method of undetermined coefficient to solve for λ .  Plug (A.2) into (A.1) 
to get: 
(A.3)   0
)()(
1
11
=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−
−
−− ttt ha
a
hah λ
θβλ
θ
λ
θ    
which means  
(A.4)   
))(1([1 λθθλ
λβθ
−−−=− a
a
h
h
t
t  
Given our conjecture (A.2),  it must be true from (A.4) that 
(A.5)   
))(1([ λθθλ
λβθλ −−−= a
a    
which uniquely solves λ  as follows 
(A.6)   [ ])1(1 βθλ −−= a  
This also characterizes the socially optimal growth rate.   
Recall from (13) that for a given ω  the privately optimal growth rate is: 
(A.7) θω
θ
tt
t a
h
h
−
−=
− 1
)1(
1
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Equating (A.6) to (A.7) it is straightforward to solve the socially optimal education 
subsidy tω  that equates the private and social growth rates.  This completes the proof.  
 
 
Appendix B 
 
Countries common to all the specifications of table 2:  
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, United States. 
 
Countries added for specifications 1, 3, 4, 5: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United 
Kingdom. 
 
The statistics provided below are calculated for the whole pool of 34 countries 
included in specifications 1, 3, 4, 5. 
 
Observations
available
Altruism 34 71.3 10.8 41.6 90.3
Subsidies 34 0.8 0.1 0.5 1.0
Democracy 33 0.9 0.2 0.2 1.0
ln of GDP per capita, PPP 34 9.5 0.8 7.7 10.3
Public expenditure/GDP, PPP 34 20.1 7.8 8.6 50.7
Invesmtnet/GDP, PPP 34 20.9 4.0 11.3 30.6
M2/GDP 22 60.5 29.5 23.4 128.7
Trade/GDP, PPP 34 68.6 34.7 18.0 151.5
Real Interest Rate 34 6.9 4.4 1.6 27.4
Values for variables averaged 1992‐2002
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
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Appendix C: Data 
Altruism and Subsidies are explained in the text. 
GDP per capita, PPP: Penn World Table. Source: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and 
Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at 
the University of Pennsylvania, September 2006. 
Public and Private Spending on Education: The private spending on education series 
is proxied by household expenditure on education.  The 
difference between ‘household’ and ‘private’ is not major (the 
latter includes expenditure by firms and other private but non-
household units).  For our model ‘household’ was the right 
choice, considering that we are looking at how individuals spent 
on their offspring’s education.  The data for household and 
government spending on education came from the Organisation 
for Economic Development and Cooperation, Education 
Statistics, Volume 2006, Issue 01, ESDS International, (Mimas) 
University of Manchester.   
Investment/GDP, PPP: World Penn Table. Source: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and 
Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at 
the University of Pennsylvania, September 2006. Expressed in 
percentage points (1% instead of 0.01). 
Degree of democracy: Measures the degree of institutionalised democracy from 0 to 1 
(where higher numbers mean more democracy). This variable is 
a linear transformation of the variable ‘Polity’ from the Polity 
IV database, which ranges from -10 to 10. Source: Monty G. 
 18
Marshall and Keith Jaggers. 2004. Polity IV Data Set. 
[Computer file; version p4v2004] College Park, MD: Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management, 
University of Maryland. 
Trade/GDP, PPP: Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as 
a share of gross domestic product.  Source: World Penn Table. 
Source: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn 
World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons 
of Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania, September 2006. Expressed in percentage points 
(1% instead of 0.01). 
M2/GDP: Ratio of Money and quasi money (M2) as a share of GDP. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) 
April 2008, ESDS International, (Mimas) University of 
Manchester. Expressed in percentage points (1% instead of 
0.01). 
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
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Pairwise Correlations Growth, GDP
Subsidy per capita (PPP) Altruism Interest rate
Subsidy 1 ‐0.05917 ‐0.29747 ‐0.4914
Growth, GDP per capita (PPP) 1 0.079564 ‐0.2419
Altruism 1 0.287229
Interest rate 1
Note: variables represent averages for 1992‐2002
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Table 2 
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Table 3 
 
 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita Growth, PPP
(1) (2) (3)
Altruism 0.001 + 0.001 * 0.001 **
(1.72) (2.09) (2.13)
Interest Rate ‐0.002 ** ‐0.002 ** ‐0.001 +
(‐2.24) (‐2.35) (‐1.74)
ln GDP per capita (PPP) ‐0.009 ‐0.011 **
(‐1.49) (‐2.79)
Public expenditure/GDP (PPP) 0.001 * 0.001 ** 0.001 ***
(2.07) (2.36) (3.09)
Investment/GDP (PPP) 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 ***
(3.23) (4.12) (3.22)
Trade/GDP (PPP) ‐1.96E‐04 * ‐1.97E‐04 * ‐2.32E‐04 *
(‐1.86) (‐2) (‐2.00)
Degree of Democracy ‐0.008
(‐0.4)
M2/GDP ‐2.33E‐04 + ‐2.21E‐04 * ‐2.19E‐04
(‐1.74) (‐1.87) (‐1.56)
Constant 0.025 *** 0.025 ‐0.091 *
(0.41) (0.43) (‐1.95)
Obs 23 24 24
R‐squared 0.656 0.656 0.488
Adj R‐squared 0.460 0.505 0.307
Notes: t-values in parenthesis, *** stands for significant at 1% level, * stands for significant at 10%, + stands for
significant at 11%. All the variables represent average values for each country for the period 1992-2002.  
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Table 4 
 
Dependent variable: Altruism Altruism
(1) (2)
Constant 115.985 *** 82.057 ***
(5.141) (16.614)
ln GDP per capita (PPP) -4.754 *
(-1.991)
M2/GDP -0.189 ***
(-2.861)
R squared 0.1013 0.1920
Adjusted R squared 0.0749 0.1560
Countries 36 24
Notes: t-values in parenthesis, *** stands for significant at 1% level,
** stands for significant at 5%, * stands for significant at 10%.
All the variables represent average values for each country for the period 1992-2002.  
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